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PUTTING THE GUESSWORK BACK INTO
CAPITAL SENTENCING
Sean D. O’Brien * †
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incontestable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of
[the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.”
Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court
to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast
thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capital crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the
Court’s concerns focused on race, class, and fairness in the imposition of the
ultimate punishment.
Four years later, Gregg v. Georgia cautiously put the executioner back in
business, conditioned upon a system of guided discretion designed to minimize the death penalty’s arbitrary and discriminatory inclinations. On the
same day it decided Gregg, the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina held
that a reasoned, moral response to any crime required consideration of the
unique circumstances of each offender, and struck down statutes that provided for the automatic imposition of the death penalty for defendants
convicted of murder. It thus made individualized consideration of the background and character of the accused “a constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Further, because of the enormous implications of erroneously taking a human life, the Court found a
strong constitutional “need for reliability in the determination that death is
the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” The Court then, in Godfrey v.
Georgia, cautioned that “if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it
has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that
avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.”
The Court’s decision last term in Kansas v. Marsh appears to deviate
from the Eighth Amendment protections insisted upon by Furman’s progeny. In Marsh, the Court responded to a Kansas Supreme Court decision
invalidating a capital sentencing statute that required jurors to impose a
death sentence even if they were unable to decide whether mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating factors. In a previous case, State v.
Kleypas, the Kansas Supreme Court had interpreted the statute to mean that
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“in doubtful cases the jury must return a sentence of death,” regardless of
any mitigating aspect of the defendant’s background, character or circumstances of the offense. By “doubtful case[],” the court meant one in which
the jury “could not fairly come to a conclusion about what balance existed
between [aggravating and mitigating circumstances].” If the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances cancel one another out, the court reasoned, then
the resulting death sentence cannot be the product of guided discretion. In
such circumstances, the risk is unacceptably high that arbitrary factors, such
as race and class, will influence the outcome. Kleypas attempted to construe
the statute to avoid the constitutional issue, as state courts had done with
similar statutes in Idaho, Montana, and New Jersey. The Kansas Supreme
Court in Marsh had decided that this issue was more appropriately left to the
legislature to write a constitutional sentencing formula, as the Colorado Supreme Court had done with a nearly identical statute.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, overturned the
Kansas court’s decision, over the dissent of Justice Stevens, who warned
that “[n]othing more than an interest in facilitating the imposition of the
death penalty in [Kansas] justified this Court’s exercise of its discretion to
review the judgment of the [Kansas] Supreme Court.” Justice Stevens’s concern that Marsh is the product of judicial activism is easy to understand. At
the heart of Justice Thomas’s opinion is a rejection of the Kansas Supreme
Court’s interpretation of its own state’s statute. The Court found that the
state court was simply wrong to conclude that “an equipoise determination
reflects juror confusion or inability to decide between life and death, or that
a jury may use equipoise as a loophole to shirk its constitutional duty to
render a reasoned, moral decision.” This seems at odds with the respect
owed to the Kansas Supreme Court as the ultimate expositor of state law.
In addition to running roughshod over the Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of its own law, the Court overlooked express waivers by the
State in order to reach the Eighth Amendment issue. In its brief in the state
court, Kansas agreed that Marsh’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment,
and conceded that Kleypas was correctly decided. When the Kansas Supreme Court relied on Kleypas to invalidate the statute altogether, the
Attorney General moved for rehearing, but still did not challenge Kleypas.
The issue on which the Supreme Court overturned the Kansas Supreme
Court was raised for the first time in the petition for certiorari. In virtually
any other context, the Court would have denied review because of the petitioner’s disrespect for the Kansas Supreme Court and its processes. Justice
Stevens’s fears about the Court’s apparent desire to facilitate executions are
well-grounded.
A remarkable aspect of Marsh is that even though the case was strictly
about capital sentencing, the issue of executing the innocent dominated the
opinions of five justices. On its face, Marsh had nothing to do with innocence. Nevertheless, four justices expressed concerns about the wisdom of
reducing constitutional barriers to execution at a time when DNA technology is exonerating death row inmates in unprecedented numbers. Justice
Souter wrote, “We cannot face up to these facts and still hold that the guar-
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antee of morally justifiable sentencing is hollow enough to allow maximizing death sentences, by requiring them when juries fail to find the worst
degree of culpability: when, by a State’s own standards and a State’s own
characterization, the case for death is ‘doubtful.’ ” While Justice Scalia attempted to manipulate the number of death row innocents to a statistically
insignificant minimum, even he conceded that the possibility of executing
an innocent person “is a truism, not a revelation.”
Equally notable about Marsh is that, aside from two passing references
to the Eighth Amendment’s mandate of “guided discretion,” there is no discussion of the Eighth Amendment concerns that were at the heart of both
Furman and Kleypas. Not even the dissenters addressed the obvious problem that the Kansas statute increases the risk of death sentences based on
race, religion, class, or other impermissible factors. Marsh is a clear sign
that this Court intends to diminish constitutional protection against arbitrary
and discriminatory death sentences. The Marsh dissent, on the other hand,
suggests that the growing awareness of the risk of executing the innocent
may have awakened new reservations about the constitutionality of the death
penalty. Whether this will lead to a constitutional showdown over the death
penalty in some future case remains to be seen. In the meantime, the duty
falls upon the Kansas Supreme Court to decide what to do with the uniquely
harsh Kansas death penalty statute.
The Kansas Supreme Court is not finished with this case. After explicitly finding that a death sentence imposed under this statute cannot be
viewed as a reasoned, moral response to the offender or the crime, the court
would be wrong to abdicate its responsibility to the United States Supreme
Court. As the plurality stated in Trop v. Dulles, the Eighth Amendment
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.” In recent years, it has been up to the
states to exercise leadership in placing reasonable limits on executions. In
Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court authorized the execution of persons with mental
retardation, in response to which many states enacted statutes exempting the
mentally retarded from execution. The Court finally followed in Atkins v.
Virginia. In Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, the Court authorized the execution of juveniles; again, states subsequently prohibited the
practice. When the Missouri Supreme Court found that evolving standards
of decency were offended by the execution of children, the Court followed
suit in Simmons v. Roper.
On remand, the Kansas Supreme Court must look to its own Constitution for guidance on what to do with this morally troubling statute. In
Kleypas, the court relied upon the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to interpret Kansas’s Bill of Rights, which prohibits “cruel or
unusual punishment.” That is understandable, given the dearth of modern
death penalty law in Kansas, and the fact that federal cases at the time sufficiently respected the human dignity of the accused by requiring a moral,
reliable determination that death is the appropriate punishment. There are,
however, compelling reasons to find that the Kansas Constitution provides
defendants greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. The Michigan Su-
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preme Court, for example, declined to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in
Harmelin v. Michigan, which found that a sentence of life without parole for
a drug offender did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Michigan courts
invalidated Harmelin’s sentence, relying on the Michigan Constitution,
which, like that of Kansas, prohibits cruel or unusual punishment.
The Kansas Supreme Court should also look to its neighbor to the West
for inspiration. In People v. Young, the Colorado Supreme Court relied upon
its own Constitution to invalidate a death penalty statute almost identical to
the Kansas statute. The Colorado Constitution, like the Eighth Amendment,
bans “cruel and unusual punishment.” Nevertheless, the Colorado Supreme
Court found that “the Colorado Constitution, written to address the concerns
of our own citizens and tailored to our unique regional location, is a source
of protection for individual rights that is independent of and supplemental to
the protections provided by the United States Constitution.”
Like Colorado, Kansas has a unique history that embraces the values at
the core of Furman and Kleypas, particularly the concern that race and class
could influence the decision to impose the death penalty. Kansas has a
unique history of tolerance and concern for human rights. Several of its major population centers were founded by abolitionists from New England,
who flocked to the territory after the Kansas-Nebraska Act put the legality
of slavery to a popular vote when each territory applied for statehood. While
officially nicknamed the “Sunflower State,” Kansas is proudly called the
“Free State” by its native inhabitants, in celebration of the 1859 ratification
of the Wyandotte Constitution, which prohibited slavery, and the subsequent
admission of Kansas to the Union in 1861 as a free state. In 1903, the Kansas legislature became one of the first in the nation to make mob lynching a
felony offense. In 1925, Kansas became the first state to outlaw the Ku Klux
Klan, and while some communities adopted segregation as a matter of local
custom, Kansas never adopted Jim Crow laws. Unlike the vast majority of
current death penalty jurisdictions, Kansas did not act quickly to reinstate
the death penalty after Furman. Kansans have historically valued social and
racial justice, and their constitutional prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment reflects a heightened concern for human dignity.
Justice Souter is correct that Marsh’s rule maximizing death sentences
undoubtedly increases the risk of executing the innocent. Equally true is that
putting guesswork back into capital sentencing is certain to exacerbate the
existing pattern of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death penalty against the poor, minorities, and other disenfranchised members of
society. These concerns are the focus of the Eighth Amendment; the mandate of reliability in capital sentencing has never been viewed as a
protection for the wrongly convicted. By refusing to become the only State
to require undecided jurors to impose death, and by continuing to insist on
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment, the
Kansas Supreme Court can make an important stand for human decency.

